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Commercial banks play a central role in our economy," and a complex
regulatory system has evolved to monitor their activities.' Among the most
controversial components of this system is the Glass-Steagall Act,$ which
1. See Reform of the Nation's Banking and Financial Systems: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987) (statement of L. William Seidman,
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) ("[A]ny threat to the banking system is a threat
to consumer services and savings, the intermediation process, private sector liquidity, the payment
system and, most importantly, the U.S. economy.").
2. Responsibility for regulating the country's more than 14,000 commercial banks is divided
among the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), state banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC), and the Department of Justice. The OCC regulates banks with charters issued by the
federal government ("national banks"). Banks with state-issued charters that are members of the Fed-
eral Reserve System (state "member" banks) are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board and their
state regulatory agency. State-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System
(state "non-member" banks) are regulated by their state regulator and, if they are federally insured,
by the FDIC. See TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR RE-
FORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVIcES 16, 18-20
(1984).
Most commercial banks are insured by the FDIC. Insurance is required for national and state
member banks. State non-member banks, however, are not required to have deposit insurance. Id. at
18 n.6.
In addition to regulation of the bank itself, a separate layer of regulation exists for the parent
holding companies of banks. The Federal Reserve Board regulates all bank holding companies in the
United States, regardless of whether the Board regulates the holding company's banking subsidiary.
Id. at 20.
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 78, 377-378 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Glass-Steagall Act was
enacted as part of the Banking Act of 1933. The Glass-Steagall provisions make up only four of the
34 sections of the Banking Act: sections 16, 20, 21, and 32. Section 16 limits the securities business of
national banks to purchasing and selling securities for customers. Id. § 24 (Seventh). This section,
however, sets forth several exceptions to its general prohibition on bank underwriting and dealing.
Thus, banks may underwrite and deal in the following "bank-eligible" securities: obligations of the
United States government; general obligations of any state or political subdivision; obligations, partici-
pations, or other instruments of, or issued by, the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) or
the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA); obligations issued under authority of the
Federal Farm Loan Act; obligations issued by the Federal Home Loan banks; and obligations or other
securities of the Student Loan Marketing Association. Id. § 24 (Seventh). Section 20 prohibits a
Federal Reserve System member bank from affiliating (i.e.j sharing the same parent holding com-
pany) with an investment banking firm. Id. § 377. Section 21 forbids any person or entity engaged in
the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing securities from accepting bank deposits.
Id. § 378. Section 32 prohibits any officer, director, or employee of an investment banking firm from
serving at the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any Federal Reserve System member
bank. Id. § 78.
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generally prohibits commercial banks from underwriting and dealing in
securities."
Since the enactment of Glass-Steagall in 1933, financial markets and
the regulatory framework controlling them have changed, bringing com-
mercial banks increasingly into competition with other firms offering fi-
nancial services. The advent of instruments such as commercial paper has
deprived banks of some of their safest lending opportunities. 5 Increased
competition from foreign lenders6 and from non-bank institutions7 has
also had a significant impact on the profitability of U.S. banks.' As profit-
4. But see Golembe, The Glass-Steagall Act-Friend or Foe?, 2 GOLEMBE REP. 3-5 (1987)
(arguing that Glass-Steagall is mischaracterized as a prohibitory statute; rather, it is, and always was
intended to be, a regulatory statute permitting banks to engage in substantial securities activities);
Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Edward J.
Kelly III, on behalf of J.P. Morgan & Co.) (making argument similar to Golembe and noting that in
1935, just two years after the enactment of Glass-Steagall, Senator Carter Glass, the primary author
of Glass-Steagall, supported proposal to permit national and state member banks (as opposed to their
affiliates) to underwrite investment securities).
5. "Commercial paper" generally refers to promissory notes issued by corporations to raise short-
term capital. Such notes usually have maturity dates of less than nine months. See Norton, Up
Against "The Wall": Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated ("Reregulated") Banking
Environment, 42 Bus. LAw. 327, 343 (1987). Today, most large, reputable corporations find it less
costly to raise short-term capital by issuing commercial paper rather than by borrowing from banks.
Between 1975 and 1985, the share of bank loans as a source of short-term corporate debt for large
manufacturing firms dropped from nearly 50% to less than 25%. Statement of Thomas C. Theobald,
Vice Chairman, Citicorp, Before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2 (Feb. 3,
1987) (on file with author) [hereinafter Statement of Thomas C. Theobald]. A Securities Industry
Association economist has estimated that investment bankers placed $992.4 billion of commercial pa-
per in 1986, more than three times the amount placed in 1980. Statement of Jeffrey M. Schaeffer,
Ph.D, Senior Vice President and Director of Research, Securities Industry Association, Before the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 8 (Feb. 3, 1987) (on file with author).
6. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 143 (statement of Thomas S. Johnson, President, Chemical
Bank); Memorandum of the New York Clearing House Association Before the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System 21 (Jan. 29, 1987) (on file with author) ("New York's premier position
[as the leading financial center] is threatened by the emergence of Tokyo and the revitalization of
London as financial centers.")
In 1970, nine of the 25, and seven of the ten, largest banks in the world were U.S. banks. In 1986,
only three of the 25, and two of the ten, largest banks were U.S. banks. Id. at 22. In 1946, U.S.
commercial banks held 57% of the nation's financial assets. By 1985, however, U.S. banks held just
33% of these assets. Litan, Taking the Danger Out of Bank Deregulation, BROOKINGS REV., Fall
1986, at 3.
7. See Note, Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposal for More
Permissive Regulation, 97 HARv. L. REv. 720 (1984). The growth of money market mutual funds
has forced banks to increase the interest rates that they must pay to attract deposits. Id. at 720 n.2.
Moreover, finance companies owned by such commercial giants as Sears and General Motors have
taken away many consumer lending opportunities from banks. Id. at 720 n.3.
8. The profitability of U.S. banks has declined significantly. Between 1979 and 1984, the banking
industry's return on equity dropped from 14.3% to 10.7%. Litan, supra note 6, at 8. Between 1979
and 1983, the after-tax return on equity for the ten largest bank holding companies dropped from
16% to 13%. J.P. MORGAN & Co., RETHINKING GLASS-STEAGALL 20 (1984). During the same
period, the after-tax return on equity for large investment banks increased from 19% to 24%. Id.
Assuring that banks are profitable is vital to maintaining a healthy economy. When banks experi-
ence financial difficulty, the consequences can be considerably greater than when a commercial entity
fails. When corporations fail, the ripple effects are generally limited geographically or to a particular
sector of the economy. Litan, supra note 6, at 3, 5. Smooth operation of the banking system, however,
depends heavily on maintaining the confidence of depositors in the safety of their banks. When one
bank experiences financial difficulty, the confidence of depositors at healthy institutions can diminish
as well, resulting in large-scale withdrawals of deposits at all banks. Id. at 5.
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ability has declined, bank failures have risen-9 This is reason for concern,
because a healthy banking system is necessary for the economy to operate
smoothly.1" Banks, therefore, should be permitted to engage in activities
that will improve their financial position as long as the investing public is
adequately protected.
The extent to which banks can, and should be permitted to, underwrite
and deal in securities has recently been considered by Congress,,1 the judi-
ciary,1 2 and bank regulators." Several commentators have convincingly
argued that Glass-Steagall should be repealed.14 This Note argues that if
Glass-Steagall is not repealed, 5 the Act should be interpreted to allow
banks to underwrite and deal in securities backed by their own assets.
Such "securitization" would not conflict with any of the purposes of
Glass-Steagall and would enable banks to increase the liquidity of their
assets and remain competitive in today's increasingly volatile financial
markets.16
9. See Bock, Bleak Year for the Banks, TIME, Dec. 28, 1987, at 60.
10. See supra note 1; see also supra note 8.
11. On March 30, 1988, the Senate passed S.1886, a bill that would give banks immediate au-
thority to underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds, and, through separately incorporated
affiliates, commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities and securities backed by consumer debt. Six
months after passage, such affiliates would be allowed to underwrite corporate debt and mutual funds.
See Nash, Key Banking Bill Passed by Senate, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1988, at Al, col. 6, D6, col. 3.
The bill is expected to face substantial opposition in the House. Id. Representative Fernand St
Germain, Chairman of the House Banking Committee, recently released a draft of proposed legisla-
tion that would give banks significantly fewer securities powers. See Nash, Bill in House Would Limit
Banks' Underwriting Power, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1988, at D13, col. 1.
12. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (approving, to
a limited extent, applications of three large commercial banks, Bankers Trust, Citicorp, and J.P.
Morgan, to engage through wholly-owned subsidiaries in the underwriting of, and dealing in, com-
mercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, municipal revenue bonds, and securities backed by con-
sumer loans), petition for cert filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3667 (U.S. Mar. 12, 1988) (No. 87-1513).
13. Banks and bank holding companies have been seeking from federal bank regulators additional
powers to deal in and underwrite securities. New York state regulators recently interpreted their own
state law version of Glass-Steagall to allow state-chartered banks to engage in a substantial amount of
securities underwriting through separate subsidiaries. Andrews, Does Glass-Steagall Matter Any-
more?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1987, at 175.
14. See R. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 60-72 (1987); DEREGULATING WALL STREET (I.
Walter ed. 1985); J.P. MORGAN & Co., supra note 8; Note, supra note 7; Isaac, The Real Reason
Glass-Steagall Still Survives, Am. Banker, Apr. 23, 1987, at 4-5, col. 1. But see Securities Indus.
Ass'n, Public Policy Issues Raised by Bank Securities Activities, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 339 (1983).
15. See supra note 11. Efforts to repeal Glass-Steagall are likely to meet with vigorous opposition
from the securities industry. The securities industry's lobbying power is well known and is evidenced
most recently by the moratorium on bank securities powers included in the Competitive Equality
Banking Act of 1987. See Corwin, A Banker's Guide to the Moratorium, ABA BANKING J., Oct.
1987, at 73. See also Isaac, supra note 14, at 5 (quoting Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, as saying that "the other side [the secur-
ities industry] has more of the green... They make big contributions to the campaigns."; noting that,
since 1981, Senator Alfonse D'Amato, formerly chairman of the Senate Banking Subcommittee on
Securities, has received more than $500,000 from "the partners, executives, and political action com-
mittees of Wall Street firms."); Shaw, Better Luck in Washington, BANKERS MAG., July-Aug. 1987,
at 55 (emphasizing banking industry's inability to organize and develop effective government relations
program); Andrews, supra note 13, at 178 (quoting a Washington bank consultant: "'The banks
don't know how to lobby. They are cheap, and they don't respect the vagaries of the political
process.' ").
16. See Pavel, Securitization, ECON. PERsp., July-Aug. 1986, at 16.
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Section I of the Note examines the current debate over the purposes
behind the Glass-Steagall Act. Section II summarizes the recent limited
approval by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) of bank
underwriting of mortgage-backed securities and explains the "trans-
parency theory"117 that underlies this approval. Section III argues that ap-
plication of the transparency theory should be expanded to permit banks
to securitize and sell their mortgage loans and other assets. This Section
demonstrates that adequate controls can be set up to prevent banks from
using these additional securities powers to effectively enter into the gen-
eral business of securities underwriting for third parties in violation of
Glass-Steagall. Section IV shows that allowing banks these additional se-
curities powers would not give rise to many of the dangers that Glass-
Steagall was designed to prevent and that regulation could effectively ad-
dress those dangers that might arise.
I. THE PURPOSES OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
Until recently, most commentators assumed that the Glass-Steagall Act
was enacted in order to promote public confidence in the banking system
and to eliminate the conflicts of interest that may arise when commercial
banks engage in securities activities.1 These goals, however, could have
been accomplished as effectively through regulation as by the prohibitory
approach used in Glass-Steagall.' 9 Thus, some scholars have argued that
the Act is best understood as a private-interest group statute conferring a
benefit-freedom from competition from commercial banks-on invest-
ment bankers.2"
Professor Langevoort has recently challenged this characterization.
Langevoort convincingly argues that Glass-Steagall is a public-interest
statute designed to eliminate the incentive of banks to use funds for specu-
lative purposes, rather than for traditional commercial lending activities.2 '
The historical record surrounding the enactment of Glass-Steagall sug-
gests that Senator Carter Glass, the primary author of the Act, believed
that the best way to ensure the banking system's stability was to prevent
banks from engaging in non-traditional activities, such as making loans to
17. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Kelly, Conflicts of Interest: A Legal View, in DEREGULATING WALL STREET supra
note 14, at 231; Note, supra note 7, at 721-22; Note, A Conduct-Oriented Approach to the Glass-
Steagall Act, 91 YALE LJ. 102, 102-03 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Conduct-Oriented Approach].
19. See Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the
Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MicH. L. REV. 672, 690-91 (1987).
20. See, e.g., Benston, Federal Regulation of Banking: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 13
J. BANK REs. 216, 222 (1983); Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 237 (1986); Macey, Special
Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMsORY
L.J. 1, 15-21 (1984).
21. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 697.
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fund the purchase of securities.22 Glass thought that smooth operation of
the banking system would be achieved if banks concentrated on their
traditional role as financial intermediary between depositors and short-
term commercial borrowers.2" The prohibition of bank underwriting and
dealing contained in Glass-Steagall can be attributed to Senator Glass'
apparent desire to ensure that banks did not become involved in specula-
tive activities. The concerns about conflicts of interest and depositor confi-
dence traditionally emphasized by commmentators24 and courts25 were
subordinate to this larger objective and can be adequately addressed
through regulation.2"
II. THE OC'S USE OF THE TRANSPARENCY THEORY
The OC27 has authorized national banks to act as principals in the
purchase and sale of securities representing interests in, or secured by,
pools of federally insured mortgages.28 The basis for these OC decisions
22. Id. See also Bishop, Questions the Bank Bill Raises, NATION'S Bus., Aug. 1933, at 46, 64;
Deposit Insurance, Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 1933, at 3 ("His [Senator Glass'] whole idea is to get the
bankers back into the banking business.").
23. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 697. Senator Glass believed that if commercial banks engaged
primarily in short-term commercial lending, the money supply would be "subject to a natural disci-
pline." Id. at 693. This theory was known as the "real bills doctrine." While popular during the
early part of this century, it has since been discredited. See Humphrey, The Real Bills Doctrine, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 3.
24. See, e.g., Note, Conduct-Oriented Approach, supra note 18, at 103 ("Congress enacted the
Glass-Steagall Act for two purposes. First, and most importantly, it sought to eliminate the conflicts of
interest that arise when commercial banks engage in the sale of securities. Second, it sought to prevent
loss of public confidence in the banking system, which had led to runs on banks and to bank failures
at the start of the Great Depression.")
25. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). The issue in Camp was the
permissibility of a plan by First National City Bank to establish and market to the general public a
collective investment fund. The Court held that, while none of City Bank's capital would be placed at
risk (since the bank would only be involved in managing investment funds of third parties), the fund
presented a number of more "subtle hazards" (i.e., conflicts of interest and confidence concerns) which
Congress sought to prevent in enacting Glass-Steagall. Id. at 630-33.
26. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 699, 714 ("In fact, it is likely that had they [the conflict of
interest and confidence concerns] been Congress' only fears-had Congress considered securities activ-
ities a proper part of the business of banking-they would have been dealt with by regulation rather
than divorce.").
27. See supra note 2 for a discussion of the roles of the OCC and the other primary bank
regulators.
28. See, e.g., Letter from Brian W. Smith, Chief Counsel of the OCC (Apr. 12, 1983), reprinted
in [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 185,421, at 77,544 (granting approval
for bank's sale of pass-through certificates backed by Federal Housing Association (FHA)-insured
mortgages purchased by the bank from GNMA, noting that pool of FHA-insured loans is "legally
transparent" and that the certificates are therefore indistinguishable from the underlying loans); Let-
ter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Russell A. Freeman (June 16, 1987), at
10-11 (on file with author) (approving Security Pacific National Bank's sale of pass-through certifi-
cates backed by a pool of bank's conventional mortgage loans and noting that OCC does not believe
"that the pooling and packaging of these assets alters the fundamental character of the transaction so
as to create a security within the meaning of Glass-Steagall.") [hereinafter Clarke Letter]; Letter from
Richard V. Fitzgerald, Chief Counsel of the Comptroller of the Currency, to Robert Tortoriello (May
22, 1986) (on file with author) (approving Liberty Norstar Bank's proposal to underwrite and deal in
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) backed by pools including conventional mortgage loans
and/or certificates approved by GNMA, FNMA, or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
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has been the notion that such securities are "legally transparent,"2 since
the holders of the securities have essentially the same rights, liabilities,
and risks as if they were the direct owners of the underlying mortgage
loans. Thus, banks may underwrite and deal in mortgage-backed securi-
ties only to the extent that they may underwrite and deal in the underly-
ing mortgage loans. According to this "transparency theory," these instru-
ments are, for Glass-Steagall and other banking law purposes, the
functional equivalent of the collateral securing them. The distinction be-
tween certificates representing interests in a pool of mortgages and the
underlying mortgage obligations thus has no legal relevance."0 The OCC
has concluded that if a national bank is authorized to issue, underwrite, or
deal in the collateral underlying a mortgage-backed security, the bank is
not required to obtain separate authorization to issue, underwrite, or deal
in the security.
The Securities Industry Association (SIA) 1 has argued that bank issu-
ance of mortgage-backed securities violates the prohibitions of Glass-
Steagall."2 However, in its recent approval of Security Pacific National
Bank's sale of mortgage-backed pass-through certificates, 3  the OCC re-
(FHLMC)) [hereinafter Fitzgerald Letter]; Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, to Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (June 18, 1986) (on file with author) (discussing Liberty
Norstar transaction); Letter and Press Release from Robert Bloom, Acting Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, to Leland S. Prussia (Mar. 29-30, 1977), reprinted in [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 97,093 (approving issue by Bank of America of securities backed by
residential mortgage portfolio) [hereinafter Bloom Letter]. Federally insured mortgages are mortgages
that are insured against the risk of default by the FHA or by the Veterans Administration (VA). This
insurance reduces the risk borne by savings and loans and other mortgage originators and thus in-
creases the availability of funds for the purchase of housing. See A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q.
JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 112-13 (3d ed. 1986); Murray & Hadaway, Mortgage-
Backed Securities: An Investigation of Legal and Financial Issues, 11 J. CORP. L. 203, 205 (1986).
The volume of privately issued mortgage-related securities has grown from about $1 billion in 1982 to
nearly $57 billion in 1986. Statement of Thomas C. Theobald, supra note 5.
29. Clarke Letter, supra note 28, at 11.
30. Id. See also Fitzgerald Letter, supra note 28; Bloom Letter, supra note 28.
31. The SIA is a national trade association which represents more than 500 investment banking
firms. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, No. 87
Civ. 4504 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. filed June 25, 1987). These firms are responsible for over 90 percent of
the brokerage and investment banking business in the United States. Id.
32. Clarke Letter, supra note 28, at 5. It has been suggested that the investment bankers are
opposed to broadening the securities powers of banks because this would increase competition in the
market for investment banking services and thus reduce profits for securities firms. See Isaac, supra
note 14, at 5.
33. Clarke Letter, supra note 28, at 5. The SIA has sought judicial review of this order. Securi-
ties Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, No. 87 Civ. 4504 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. filed June 25, 1987).
There are three basic types of mortgage-backed securities: pass-throughs, mortgage-backed bonds,
and pay-throughs. A pass-through certificate represents direct ownership in a portfolio of mortgage
loans that are similar in interest rate, quality, and term to maturity. The portfolio is placed in a trust,
and certificates of ownership are sold to investors. The loan originator services the mortgage portfolio
and collects interest and principal, passing on these amounts, less a servicing fee, to the investors.
Pavel, supra note 16, at 15-16. Mortgage-backed bonds are also collateralized by a portfolio of mort-
gages. Id. at 16-17. Unlike the pass-through, however, mortgage-backed bonds are debt obligations of
the issuer. As a result, the portfolio of mortgages which are used as collateral remain on the issuer's
books as assets and the bonds are considered liabilities. In addition, the cash flows from the collateral
are not used for the payment of principal and interest on the bonds. The bonds have a stated matur-
ity, generally between five and twelve years, and interest is usually paid semiannually. Id. at 18. Like
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jected the SIA's arguments. The OCC held that the mortgage-backed cer-
tificates were not "securities" within the meaning of Glass-Steagall."
Rather, sale of the certificates merely represented a sale of the bank's own
assets, since the certificate holders had essentially the same rights, liabili-
ties, and risks as if they owned the underlying assets.
Even assuming that the certificates were securities within the meaning
of Glass-Steagall, the OCC held that the proposed issuance by Security
Pacific would not violate the prohibitions of either section 16 or section 21
of the Act. Section 16 permits a bank to deal in securities and stock, but
only if such dealing is "limited to purchasing and selling such securities
and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of,
customers, and in no case for its own account. . ." 5 Section 16 also
provides that banks "shall not underwrite any issue of securities or
stock.""6 Section 21 prohibits any organization "engaged in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing . .-. securities" from engag-
ing at the same time in the business of receiving deposits.87 The OCC
noted that "underwriting" refers to the process of purchasing another
company's newly issued securities for distribution and sale to investors
and that "dealing" involves the purchase and sale of another company's
securities in the secondary market. Since Security Pacific wanted only to
participate in the initial sale of instruments backed by its own mortgage
loans, the OCC held that the proposed transaction involved neither "un-
derwriting" nor "dealing.""8
mortgage-backed bonds, pay-through bonds are collateralized by mortgage loans and appear on the
issuer's books as debt. The cash flows from the underlying mortgages, however, are used to service the
bonds in a manner similar to that of pass-throughs. One common type of pay-through bond is known
as the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) and was first issued in June 1983. CMO issues are
divided into maturity classes (usually four). Each class receives semiannual interest payments. Class 1
bondholders receive the first installments of principal payments and any prepayments until Class I
bonds are paid off. Class 2 bondholders, in turn, receive principal payments and prepayments before
Class 3 bondholders are paid off. Class 3 bondholders are paid off next, followed by those in Class 4.
The use of this class structure makes the term of the securities more certain. Thus, CMOs mitigate
the risk of prepayment (i.e., the risk that a borrower will repay the principal amount of the loan
earlier than schedule) for those who hold bonds in classes 3 and 4, since any prepayments are first
paid to the earlier classes of bondholders. CMOs also provide shorter maturity classes of mortgage
securities (classes 1 and 2). Thus, investors who might not have otherwise invested in mortgages (i.e.,
those concerned with prepayment risk and those desiring shorter maturity periods) have entered the
mortgage securities market. As a result, CMOs have become quite popular. Id. at 19.
34. Clarke Letter, supra note 28, at 10-11.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (Supp. IV 1986).
36. Id.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982).
38. Clarke Letter, supra note 28, at 12-13. To support its holding in the Security Pacific transac-
tion, the OCC also relied in part on additional language in section 21 which states that "nothing in
this paragraph shall be construed as affecting in any way such right as any bank ... may otherwise
possess to sell, without recourse or agreement to repurchase, obligations evidencing loans on real
estate." 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982). This language reflects a congressional desire to leave the sec-
ondary market for mortgage loans undisturbed. See Clarke Letter, supra note 28, at 18.
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III. EXPANDING THE APPLICATION OF THE TRANSPARENCY THEORY
The approach used by the OCC in the Security Pacific transaction is
typical of most courts and bank regulatory agencies confronted with
Glass-Steagall issues. Courts usually focus on the language of the statute
to determine whether a proposed activity involves a "security" and, if so,
whether the proposed activity constitutes "underwriting" or "dealing." 39
Under Professor Langevoort's approach, a court would permit any securi-
ties activity that would not divert bank funds to speculative uses.40 Ac-
cording to Langevoort, his approach, like the transparency theory, would
permit banks to securitize and sell their own assets, since this would
merely assist banks in performing their traditional role as intermediary
between net savers and net borrowers.4 Adoption of Langevoort's ap-
proach, however, would force courts to change their method of analyzing
Glass-Steagall issues. Rather than focusing on the meaning of such terms
as "security," "underwriting," and "dealing," courts would have to deter-
mine whether a proposed activity would take banks out of their traditional
role as intermediary between depositors and commercial borrowers.
It is uncertain whether, in applying Professor Langevoort's approach,
courts would reach results consistent with his desires. Determining
whether a securities activity of a bank is "speculative" is no easy task for
courts that are unfamiliar with the intricacies of banking law.42 Judges
are generally not proficient at construing complex economic statutes like
Glass-Steagall.4 The transparency theory requires courts to determine
only whether the collateral underlying the instrument to be underwritten
is a bank asset. By charging the courts with this more manageable in-
quiry, the transparency theory ensures results which are consistent with
the purposes of Glass-Steagall.
This Note proposes expanding the application of the transparency the-
ory to permit banks to underwrite and deal in securities backed by any of
their own assets. In the Security Pacific transaction discussed in Section
II, the OCC emphasized that the proposed securities issuance represented
merely a sale of Security Pacific's own assets (in that case, mortgage
loans) which involved neither "securities" nor "underwriting" or "deal-
39. See Note, Conduct-Oriented Approach, supra note 18, at 102.
40. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
41. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 716 n.143 ("Hopefully, the courts will recognize that where the
bank itself securitizes some of its own loan portfolio, there is no overriding reason why it should not
be able to shift the risk and return interest to individual investors .... ").
42. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137, 181 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("Careful attention to the statutory language is especially important in an area as technical
and complex as banking law, where the policies actually enacted into law are complicated and diffi-
cult for a nonspecialist judiciary to discern in their proper perspective.").
43. Cf. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRuST LAw: An Eco-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976) (both arguing that courts have failed to properly analyze economic issues
raised in antitrust cases).
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ing" as those terms are used in Glass-Steagall."' This rationale provides
the basis for expanding application of the transparency theory to allow
banks to securitize and sell their other assets as well.45 To ensure that
banks do not use their increased powers to purchase loans or other assets
from third parties and immediately securitize and sell them, a meaningful
definition of what constitutes the bank's own assets for purposes of securi-
tization is needed. Adoption of the definition proposed in this Note will
prevent banks from making a de facto entrance into the generally prohib-
ited business of underwriting and dealing in securities for third parties.
A. Assets Eligible for Securitization
Expanding the scope of the transparency theory would permit banks to
enhance the liquidity of their assets. 48 This would provide banks with
increased opportunity to remove higher-risk assets from their balance
sheets.4 Moreover, as will be shown in Section IV, an expansion in this
44. Clarke Letter, supra note 28, at 6.
45. The transparency theory could be extended to permit banks to become involved in even
greater securities powers. For example, the theory could be used to permit banks to underwrite and
deal in instruments of other banks that are backed by "bank-eligible" securities. Such underwriting
and dealing would not differ from the activities that section 16 of Glass-Steagall explicitly permits. See
supra note 3. The risk involved in underwriting and dealing in a security backed by a pool of GNMA
certificates surely would not be greater than underwriting or dealing in the GNMA certificates them-
selves (which section 16 already permits).
The transparency theory could also be used to allow banks to offer mutual funds which are com-
prised solely of bank-eligible securities. Such funds are quite popular and could generate significant
revenues without placing any bank capital at risk. See, e.g., PRUDENTIAL-BACHE GOVERNMENT PLUS
FUND II, PROSPECTUS 12 (Mar. 9, 1988) (listing Prudential-Bache's five mutual funds which invest
primarily in U.S. Government securities, with total net assets exceeding $5.4 billion as of Jan. 31,
1988).
The Supreme Court refused to permit banks to operate open-end investment companies in Invest-
ment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), because of concern that banks would become involved
in the kind of promotional efforts that characterize the work of securities firms and which Congress
sought to avoid. Id. at 630-34. Whatever merit this argument has in general, the Supreme Court's
rationale in Camp is not applicable where only bank-eligible securities are involved. Since Congress
has explicitly permitted banks to underwrite and deal in bank-eligible securities, it makes little sense
to refuse to allow banks to offer mutual funds which are made up of these very same securities.
46. Pavel, supra note 16, at 16. Banks need liquidity to compete with non-bank institutions and
foreign banks. See Corrigan, Financial Market Structure: A Longer View, 72 FED. RESERVE BANK
OF N.Y. ANN. REP. 12 (1987) ("The efficient working of a large modern economy clearly requires
the presence of a stock of assets which are highly liquid and readily transferable. .... ").
47. Drexel, Burnham, Lambert & Co. has designed a plan for banks to package and sell their
nonperforming loans at a large discount. Apcar, Banks Increasingly Sell Parts of Their Loan Portfo-
lio, Wall St. J., March 4, 1987, at 14, col. 1. Because of the time value of money, banks would be
willing to accept a lesser amount for bad loans today rather than wait years to recover a greater
percentage of the loans, since the price received for the loans could be reinvested in more promising
lending activities. Id.
Virtually all loans that have been securitized to date, however, have been of high quality. Lowell
Bryan, a director of McKinsey & Co., argues that low-quality loans cannot be efficiently securitized
under the current bank regulatory regime. See Bryan, The Credit Bomb in Our Financial System,
HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 45, 49. Under the current regime, deposit insurance premiums
and capital requirements do not take account of the riskiness of a bank's loan portfolio. Banks, there-
fore, have no real incentive to sell high-risk loans if their expected loss exceeds the capital that banks
are required by regulators to keep on hand in case the loans become nonperforming.
There has long been discussion about the need for risk-based deposit insurance and capital require-
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manner would not give rise to any of the dangers that Glass-Steagall was
enacted to avoid. Banks should be permitted to securitize any of their as-
sets, regardless of their underlying risk.4
1. High-Quality Assets
The transparency theory should be expanded to permit banks to securi-
tize such low-risk assets as: automobile loans; credit card receivables; and
high-quality commercial loans. Automobile loans were first packaged and
sold as securities by investment banks in 1985."" These securities, known
as "certificate of automobile receivables" (CARs), are pass-through secur-
ities in which the interest and principal of the underlying auto loans are
passed on to the security holders. The first public offering of CARs took
place in March 1985, when Salomon Brothers offered $60 million of pass-
through securities backed by automobile loans originated and serviced by
Marine Midland Bank. 0
The only difference between CARs and mortgage-backed securities is
the nature of the underlying collateral. Auto loans require more monitor-
ing than loans secured by real property,51 and therefore generally require
higher servicing fees. This difference, however, is not relevant under the
transparency theory, which is primarily concerned with allowing banks to
securitize and sell assets that they can otherwise sell through more con-
ments. See, e.g., Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Proposals for Federal
Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. RE,. 857 (1971). The Federal bank regulatory agencies have
recently recommended adoption of a system of risk-based capital requirements developed by represent-
atives of the bank regulatory authorities of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Switzerland, and Luxembourg. Risk-
Based Capital Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 8549 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 225, 325)
(proposed Mar. 15, 1988). The proposal advocates the use of a weighting system under which a
bank's assets and off-balance sheet items (such as letters of credit) would be classified into five risk
categories according to the credit risk of the obligor. Id. at 8552. These categories primarily distin-
guish between United States Government securities, which are assigned to the lower risk categories,
and loans to private borrowers, which are assigned to the highest risk category. Id. at 8557-59.
The major obstacle to implementing a more refined risk-based system is, of course, the inability to
accurately quantify the risk of particular loans. If most bank assets were securitized, the market value
of those assets and their corresponding risk could be determined. Pavel, supra note 16, at 24. If,
however, banks guarantee the principal and interest on their securitized assets, and if the FDIC pays
the holders of any such guarantees made by failed banks, the FDIC would be indirectly guaranteeing
the securities. Such indirect guarantees would be taken into account in pricing the securities and
would force regulators to value the FDIC's indirect guarantees in order to determine accurately the
riskiness of a bank's loan portfolio. Id. Unfortunately, valuing these guarantees would be quite diffi-
cult, inhibiting the ability of regulators to implement effectively a system of risk-based deposit insur-
ance and capital requirements.
48. Section 21 of Glass-Steagall contains explicit language in support of allowing banks to sell
mortgage loans freely. See supra note 38. While explicit statutory language supporting a bank's abil-
ity to sell these other underlying assets would provide further support for a decision to allow banks to
underwrite and deal in securities backed by these assets, it is certainly not a prerequisite to such a
decision.
49. Pavel, supra note 16, at 19.
50. Id. at 19-20,
51. A car is not stationary and does not maintain its value as well as a home. It therefore requires
greater effort to monitor an automobile than a fixed, more permanent structure such as a house.
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ventional means. Banks are already permitted to buy and sell car loans,
and, as long as there are adequate regulatory controls in place to protect
against abuse of fiduciary duties,5" biased investment counseling, 3 and ty-
ing," banks should be permitted to securitize these loans as well.
In April 1986, Salomon Brothers privately placed $50 million of pass-
through certificates backed by a pool of credit card receivables owned by
Bank One of Columbus, Ohio. 5 These receivables represent debts owed
by holders of credit cards issued by the bank. As with mortgages and car
loans, banks can freely sell their credit card receivables. An investor who
purchases a security backed by a pool of these receivables obtains the same
interest as if she had purchased the underlying receivables themselves. As
long as adequate regulatory controls are in place to protect investors,
allowing banks to underwrite and deal in securities backed by their credit
card receivables would not raise any of the concerns which underlie Glass-
Steagall.
The transparency theory should also be expanded to permit banks to
securitize and sell their low-risk commercial loans. Banks often sell such
loans, and as long as adequate controls exist to protect the investing public
from abuse, the Glass-Steagall Act should be interpreted to allow banks
the opportunity to securitize them. To date, commercial loans have rarely
been securitized. Because such loans are less homogeneous than automo-
bile loans and credit card receivables, their securitization is more diffi-
cult.56 In addition, banks have a number of alternatives to securitization,
such as whole loan sales, participations, and syndications.5"
2. Low-Quality Assets
Many banks currently find themselves holding high-risk assets as a re-
sult of aggressive lending to farmers, oil companies, real estate developers,
and Third World nations. 8 Allowing banks to underwrite securities
backed by these loans would provide banks with an immediate source of
52. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 99-102.
55. Pavel, supra note 16, at 21. These certificates, called "certificates of amortizing revolving
debts" (CARDs) have a stated maturity date of five years. For the first 18 months, certificate holders
receive only the interest payment made on the receivables. Principal payments made during this time
are used to purchase additional receivables. Following the first 18 months, investors receive principal
payments.
56. Commercial loans have widely varying terms to maturity, pricing, and timing of payments.
Pavel, supra note 17, at 25. Commercial loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration
(SBA), however, have been securitized, because they are more uniform and much of the risk is as-
sumed by the federal government. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Bock, supra note 9, at 60; Berg, Three Major Banks Post Big Losses, N.Y. Times,
July 22, 1987, at D1, col. 6; Schmitt & Hill, Banks to Post Record $10 Billion Loss for 2nd Quar-
ter, Wall St. J., July 20, 1987, at 2, col. 1.
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funds that could be allocated to more promising lending activities."9 Such
securitization would permit banks to offer investors a diversified mix of
loans that would command a higher return than if the loans were sold on
a piecemeal basis."0 As is the case with other high-risk securities (like
junk bonds), the antifraud and disclosure provisions of the securities laws
would provide sufficient protection for investors who might purchase a
security made up of these problem loans."1
B. Ensuring that Banks Do Not Liberalize the Definition of "Assets" to
Exploit the Transparency Theory
The Glass-Steagall Act generally prohibits banks from underwriting se-
curities for third parties.82 Thus, before courts and bank regulators ex-
pand the transparency theory, a precise definition of "bank assets eligible
for securitization" is needed to prevent a bank from purchasing loans
from third parties (so that the loans would then be considered part of the
bank's own assets) and immediately securitizing and selling them to inves-
tors at a profit. This problem of potential abuse can be minimized by
defining "bank assets eligible for securitization" as assets that are held for
investment, rather than trading, purposes. A loan bought with the sole or
primary intent of securitizing and selling it for short-term profit would be
treated as having been purchased for trading purposes. On the other hand,
a bank that purchases a loan with the intention of servicing and account-
ing for the loan as part of its own portfolio, thinking that it could do so
more profitably than the originating bank (e.g., because of economies of
scale enjoyed by the purchasing bank in servicing a particular type of
loan), would be considered to have bought the loan for investment
purposes.
Bank examiners could be entrusted with the task of ensuring that banks
are securitizing only assets that they originated or assets purchased for
investment purposes. In determining whether an asset is appropriately
characterized as being held for investment purposes, bank examiners
would perform the following procedures: (1) review internal bank memo-
randa and minutes of Board of Directors' meetings; (2) conduct interviews
with key bank personnel; (3) review the elapsed time between asset acqui-
sition and securitization and sale; and (4) review the bank's current and
historical activity in transactions similar to those at issue. Bank manage-
59. See supra note 47 for the conflicting views as to the feasibility of securitizing nonperforming
loans under the current system of deposit insurance and capital requirements which do not take ac-
count of the riskiness of a bank's loan portfolio.
60. For example, loans from Third World nations could be packaged in order to achieve geo-
graphic diversity, so that loans from volatile regions are mixed with loans from more stable areas. In
addition, loans made to public entities could be mixed with loans to private entities to enable investors
to further diversify their risk.
61. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
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ment should be required to report to the Board of Directors the purpose
behind any acquisition of loans from another bank.
If it were discovered that loans were purchased and immediately securi-
tized in violation of Glass-Steagall, bank examiners could terminate the
activity under its statutory authority to eliminate "unsafe or unsound"
practices."3 The regulatory agencies could also assess civil fines" or re-
move the directors or officers responsible for the illegal sales.65
Bank examiners already play a similar oversight role in another con-
text. Under the current regulatory system, a bank is allowed to trade on
its own account in certain approved securities. A bank's trading inventory
of securities must be accounted for at -market value or at- the lower of cost
or market value, whichever method it uses for tax purposes.66 In contrast,
a bank may account for securities which it purchases for investment pur-
poses, such as for its trust accounts, using the historical cost method.67
Bank examiners are charged with the responsibility of investigating a
bank's characterization of its securities activities. Such examiners are
given the power to issue cease and desist orders, assess civil monetary pen-
alties, and remove those directors and officers who commingle securities
purchased for trading purposes and securities bought for investment
purposes.
IV. PROTECTING AGAINST CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THREATS
TO BANK SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS
The primary purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act was to ensure that
banks would not divert funds from traditional, productive uses to more
speculative endeavors.6 8 Concern with conflicts of interest and other
soundness problems that could arise from bank involvement in securities
underwriting or dealing were ancillary to that objective.6" These ancillary
concerns can be adequately protected against through regulation. Glass-
Steagall's prohibitory language only refers to its primary con-
cern-preventing banks from using depositor funds for speculative
purposes.
This Section will show that the concerns about conflicts of interest and
bank safety that could arise if banks were permitted to securitize and sell
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a), (b) (1982).
64. Id. § 1818(i).
65. Id. § 1818(e).
66. See FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION
OF REPORTS OF CONDITION AND INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC OFFICES ONLY AND TO-
TAL ASSETS OF $300 MILLION OR MORE RC-2, A-37 (1987).
67. Under the historical cost approach, a security owned by a bank is valued on the bank's finan-
cial statements at its purchase price. The lower of cost or market approach, on the other hand, forces
a bank to reduce the reported value of a security whenever the market price falls below its purchase
price.
68. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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their own assets would be adequately controlled by the current regulatory
system. This system has been strengthened substantially since the enact-
ment of Glass-Steagall, and further strengthening of the regulatory system
could provide additional protection.
A. Conflicts of Interest
Permitting banks to securitize and sell their own assets could create
perverse incentives for banks to: (1) enter into unfavorable loan and secur-
ities transactions in order to ensure the success of their securities depart-
ments; (2) finance investor purchases of issues underwritten by their se-
curities departments; (3) fail to maintain independence in exercising their
fiduciary duties; (4) fail to render sound, objective investment advice; and
(5) "tie" the extension of credit to the purchase of some of their securi-
tized assets.70 As the analysis below indicates, these conflicts of interest
can be adequately controlled through regulation of the securitization
process.
In addition to legal regulation, three other factors may help prevent
banks from exploiting conflicts of interest: (1) the market for corporate
control, through which mismanaged banks (whose stock is undervalued)
could be taken over by investors who could then replace current manage-
ment with a more prudent group;71 (2) the concern with maintaining a
favorable reputation in the financial markets, which may constrain risky
behavior by banks concerned with their continued ability to obtain funds
for lending activities;72 and (3) the monitoring activities of bank regula-
70. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 233-35.
71. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1169-74 (1981); Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of
the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 225, 229-30 (1985); Winter, State Law, Share-
holder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 264-66 (1977). Under
current law, commercial firms and banks cannot have common ownership. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)
(1982). Banks, however, are susceptible to takeover attempts by individual investor groups or by other
banks.
72. See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549,
619 (1984); Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 53, 93-94 (1986). A debate has arisen over the extent to which depositors can and do
control bank risk-taking. Professor Garten argues that most uninsured depositors (the only depositors
with any incentive to monitor bank risk) do not vigilantly monitor bank management and that deposi-
tors generally rely on the liquidity of their investments, rather than on an analysis of bank financial
reports, to protect themselves against risk of loss. Garten, Still Banking on the Market: A Comment
on the Failure of Market Discipline, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 241, 241-42 (1988). Such depositors simply
withdraw their money from a bank 'at the first sign of trouble instead of monitoring bank risk and
exerting pressure on management to reduce such risk. Id. at 243.
Professor Macey and Elizabeth Garrett, on the other hand, argue that empirical studies demon-
strate that depositors do exert some control on bank risk-taking and that the bank regulatory system
should be modified to increase the incentive of depositors to monitor bank risk with greater vigilance.
Macey & Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical
Arguments, 5 YALE J. oN REG. 215, 233-37 (1988) (suggesting a move to risk-related deposit insur-
ance and adoption of a modified payout procedure by the FDIC to expose uninsured depositors to the
risk of loss in the event of a bank failure).
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tors, which should constrain even those desperate, failing banks that are
no longer concerned with maintaining a favorable reputation."
1. Ill-advised Loan and Securities Transactions
Allowing a bank to engage in securities activities might lead the bank to
enter into unfavorable loan and securities transactions to ensure the suc-
cess of its securities department.74 Thus, it is feared that a bank would
lend more freely to its own securities department than it would to outside
borrowers. Concern has also been expressed that a bank would purchase
securities (for its trust accounts or for its own trading or investment port-
folio) which its securities department had been unable to sell."' This con-
cern would be relevant if the bank's securities department involved itself
in the speculative securities of third parties so as to threaten the welfare of
depositors or shareholders. Allowing a bank to securitize and sell its own
assets, however, would not present any new threats to depositors or share-
holders, since they are already exposed to the risks associated with the
underlying assets to be securitized. In fact, if anything, allowing such
securitization helps protect their interests, because this activity gives the
bank broader opportunity to sell problem assets at a more attractive
price.7 6
It could be argued that allowing banks this flexibility in selling their
assets gives them a dangerous incentive to engage in high-risk lending to
the detriment of depositors or shareholders. The primary income-
producing activity of banks, however, is lending. In order to maximize
profits, banks must assemble strong, diversified loan portfolios. The mar-
ket for corporate control should help to prevent bank officers from making
reckless loan decisions, since the market price of the shares of stock of a
bank that is not being run efficiently will decline and the bank will then
become an attractive takeover candidate. 7
While allowing banks to securitize and sell their loans and other assets
73. Examiners use a composite rating system, with five categories, to assess the financial condition
of banks. Bank regulators pay special attention to institutions that receive ratings in the weakest three
categories. See Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Uniform Financial Rating Sys-
tem, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 198,110 (Nov. 21, 1979); see also E.
SYMONS & J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 572-74 (2d ed. 1984). Thus, examiners could focus particular
attention on preventing the management of a failing bank from securitizing and selling all of the
bank's high-quality assets, embezzling the proceeds, and leaving only the nonperforming loans to
satisfy the claims of depositors and shareholders.
74. Kelly, supra note 18, at 233.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 47 for a discussion of the conflicting views as to the feasibility of securitizing
and selling high-risk assets under the current system of deposit insurance and capital requirements,
which does not take into account the riskiness of a bank's loan portfolio.
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. It is possible that, rather than respond to the
market for corporate control by reducing risk, bank management might continue its risky activity and
merely shift such risk to depositors or to the FDIC. Concern with maintaining a favorable reputation
among depositors and monitoring by bank examiners, however, should help to discourage banks from
taking excessive risks. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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promotes liquidity, the price that investors pay for such securities will be
inversely related to the riskiness of the underlying assets. 8 Securitization
only facilitates the saleability of bank assets; it does not guarantee a speci-
fied price from investors. Thus, a profit-maximizing bank, in making
lending decisions, will not disregard risk considerations just because it is
confident that it can securitize and sell any loans that later turn out to be
bad.
2. Imprudent Loans to Finance the Distribution of Securities
Some have asserted that permitting banks greater securities powers
could lead them to lend more freely to investors who plan to purchase
issues underwritten by their own securities department.7 According to
this scenario, banks would finance purchases of securities that they would
otherwise not finance if the securities purchased were not issued by the
banks' own securities departments. A bank, however, would have no eco-
nomic incentive to engage in this kind of financing. The bank gains noth-
ing by making a loan that it would not otherwise make in order to sup-
port the purchase of a high-risk security issued by its securities
department. Once the securities department decides to underwrite or deal
in a security, the bank bears the risks associated with holding that instru-
ment. If a bank lends money to a third party on the basis of this security
to support the bank's securities department, the bank's loan department
assumes these risks. Thus, such a loan transaction would merely shift the
bank's risks associated with the security from its securities department to
its loan department and would not benefit the bank.
Even if this conflict were perceived as a problem, regulation could ade-
quately protect against abuses. Restrictions could be imposed on the
amount that a bank could loan to a customer to purchase a bank's own
securities issuances.80 In addition, Section 11 (d)(1) of the Exchange Act of
193481 could be used to prohibit a bank's securities department from di-
rectly or indirectly arranging for the extension of credit to a customer on
any security in the distribution of which the department participated
within 30 days prior to such credit extension.
3. The Independence of Bank Fiduciary Activities
A bank's involvement in securities underwriting, it is argued, could af-
fect the independent exercise of its fiduciary duties. For example, a bank
78. See Pavel, supra note 16, at 24 ("The riskiness of a loan-backed security is the main determi-
nant of its price. The riskier the security, the lower the price, and the higher the yield."). This is, of
course, why junk bonds and other instruments of companies with low credit ratings have such high
yields.
79. Kelly, supra note 18, at 233-34.
80. Id. at 238.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d)(1) (1982).
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might sell to customers of its trust department securities that it is under-
writing and having difficulty selling.82 While a bank could securitize some
of its high-risk assets and sell them to its own trust accounts, legal rules
are already in place to protect against such a possibility. The common law
has long prohibited self-dealing by a trustee.8 The common law rules
against self-dealing are liberally supplemented by statute and regulation.
Some states have enacted legislation prohibiting self-dealing by state-
chartered bank trustees.84 The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA) imposes severe penalties on pension plan trustees (a role
in which bank trust departments often serve) who engage in self-dealing.8"
The OCC has also promulgated regulations which prohibit self-dealing."
This conflict of interest has long existed for securities firms and even
for banks.8 7 Securities firms provide investment advice in addition to un-
derwriting and dealing in securities. Similarly, banks have long been al-
lowed to underwrite and deal in United States Government and municipal
securities in addition to performing their banking and fiduciary func-
tions.8" The existing legal rules appear to have effectively prevented
abuses by securities firms and banks. A 1975 Treasury Department study
noted that it had no record of any exploitation of conflicts by banks in
forty years of underwriting general obligation municipal bonds.8 9 A 1977
Federal Reserve Board study of private placement activities of commercial
banks also failed to uncover any abuses.90
4. Inability to Provide Disinterested Investment Advice
Some commentators have argued that a bank will be unable to render
sound, objective investment advice if it has a promotional stake in certain
securities.91 Securities firms, however, have long been permitted to under-
write, trade, and even maintain markets in securities and, at the same
time, render investment advice. Moreover, banks already engage in a sig-
nificant amount of underwriting of, and dealing in, United States Govern-
ment and municipal securities. A bank, therefore, already has a strong
incentive to encourage investors to purchase the securities that the bank
has underwritten or is dealing in, since the bank has a substantial stake in
82. Kelly, supra note 18, at 233.
83. See, e.g., G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95 (6th ed. 1987).
84. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAw § 100-b, subd. 1 (McKinney 1971); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 403(h) (Purdon 1967); IOWA CODE ANN. § 524.1002(5) (West 1970).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 4975 (1982).
86. 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(a) (1987).
87. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 237.
88. See supra note 3 (discussing bank-eligible securities).
89. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SEcIuTmEs ArIVITIES 35
n.41 (1975), cited in Kelly, supra note 18, at 237.
90. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, COMMERCIAL BANK PRIVATE PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES 65
(1977), cited in Kelly, supra note 18, at 237.
91. Kelly, supra note 18, at 234.
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the performance of such securities. 2 When engaged in either underwrit-
ing or dealing, the bank bears the risk that it will not be able to resell
these securities at a profit, just as it bears the risk that any of its other
assets will decline in value. Thus, permitting a bank the additional securi-
ties powers suggested in this paper would not provide any greater incen-
tive for the bank to provide biased investment advice than already exists in
the case of government securities in which the bank has an ownership
interest.
Nevertheless, if this conflict were perceived as a problem, regulatory
action could be taken to prevent abuses. For example, banks could be pre-
vented from distributing to depositors promotional information regarding
securities issuances."3 The Federal Reserve Board already prohibits bank
holding companies from making promotional information available to the
public at any office of the holding company." Similar regulations could be
implemented for non-member banks. In addition, the securities laws (in-
cluding the disclosure requirements95 and the antifraud provisions9") and
the Investment Advisers Act97 could be made applicable to banks in order
to prevent abuses.9"
5. Tying the Extension of Credit to the Purchase of Securities
Opponents of increased bank securities powers have also argued that a
bank might attempt to "tie" the extension of credit to the purchase of
securities issued by the bank's securities department. 9 To obtain credit, a
customer would have to agree to purchase the securities. The antitrust
laws are designed to prevent this sort of tying arrangement."' 0 In addition,
Section 106(b) of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970101 prohibits most tying arrangements. Moreover, given the available
substitutes for almost all banking services and the increasing geographic
reach of credit markets, banks would lack the market power to carry out a
tying arrangement.10 2
92. See Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies,
73 VA. L. REv. 301, 325 (1987). In fact, it could be argued that bank investment advice would be
more objective if banks could engage in a broader range of financial services. Id.
93. Kelly, supra note 18, at 239.
94. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(h) (1987). The Supreme Court upheld the validity of these regulations
in Board of Governors v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
95. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7g, 77j, 77aa (1982).
96. Id. § 7 7 q (1982).
97. Id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1982).
98. Except for the antifraud provisions, the Securities Act of 1933 does not currently apply to
banks. Id. § 77c(a)(2) (1982). A number of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 also do not apply to banks. Id. § 78c(a)(4). In addition, the Investment Advisers Act excludes
banks from its coverage. Id.
99. See Kelly, supra note 18, at 234.
100. Id. at 241.
101. 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982).
102. See Fischel, Rosenfield, & Stillman, supra note 92, at 329. A bank might try to induce an
unwitting borrower into believing that the bank has such market power. Competition among financial
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B. Safety and Soundness
In addition to preventing the conflicts of interest discussed above, an-
other ancillary purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act is to maintain public
confidence in the safety and soundness of the commercial banking sys-
tem."' 3 Congress was concerned that bank involvement in securities un-
derwriting or dealing would lead to a loss of public confidence in the
banking system, causing depositors to withdraw their funds and, in turn,
resulting in widespread bank failures.'" Most bank failures, however, are
attributable to unwise loans and/or imprudent management rather than
to involvement in non-traditional activities. 05 A study examining all 120
commercial bank failures between 1971 and 1982 revealed that only one
bank failed because of its involvement in non-banking activities.106 More-
over, other empirical studies suggest that activity diversification by banks
can actually reduce the volatility of bank performance.' 07
Legislators and bank regulators generally believe that non-traditional
activities should be confined to separate subsidiaries of bank holding com-
panies rather than allowing the banks themselves to engage in these activi-
ties.1 8 Professor Clark notes that the fundamental reason for organizing
the non-traditional activities separately is to ease the regulator's job of
monitoring the safety and soundness of the banking system.'0 9 As dis-
cussed above, however, permitting banks to securitize and sell their assets
would not threaten the stability of the financial system. Moreover, it is far
from obvious that those activities which banks are currently engaged in,
such as trading foreign currencies, lending to Third World nations, or
underwriting and dealing in government securities, present any less of a
problem for regulators in assessing bank soundness than would the securi-
tization and sale of bank assets." 0 In practice, banks might not be truly
insulated if a separately incorporated non-banking affiliate experienced
financial difficulties." Thus, few benefits are likely to accrue from re-
services firms, however, should ensure that debtors are adequately informed about the alternative
financing sources available.
103. See Langevoort, supra note 19, at 699, 714.
104. See Note, Conduct-Oriented Approach, supra note 18, at 106 ("Congress was convinced
that banks' speculative securities promotion and perilous underwriting activities led to the loss of
depositor confidence and customer good will that caused the depression era bank runs.")
105. Saunders, Bank Safety and Soundness and the Risks of Corporate Securities Activities, in
DEREGULATING WALL STREET, supra note 14, at 181.
106. Id. at 181-82.
107. Id. at 176-77. Expanding the transparency theory even further to permit banks to under-
write and deal in instruments of other banks backed by bank-eligible securities and to offer mutual
funds comprised solely of bank-eligible securities, see supra note 43, would, therefore, likely increase
the banking system's stability.
108. R. LITAN, supra note 14, at 145.
109. Clark, The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies, 92 HARV. L. REv. 787, 815
(1979).
110. See Fischel, Rosenfield & Stillman, supra note 92, at 321.
111. See R. LrrAN, supra note 14, at 146 ("[T]here is evidence that banks will find ways of
assisting their nonbanking affiliates if these affiliates encounter financial trouble."). In fact, Continen-
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quiring the securitization and sale of bank assets to be conducted within
separately capitalized affiliates." 2
V. CONCLUSION
The financial markets have changed substantially in recent years.
Banks have lost many of their safest lending opportunities to underwriters
of commercial paper, and competition from money market mutual funds
has increased the interest rates that banks must pay to attract deposits.
Hopefully, Congress will repeal Glass-Steagall and permit bank holding
companies to engage in a full range of securities activities. Until this oc-
curs, however, courts and bank regulators should use the transparency
theory to permit banks the securities powers advocated in this Note. This
would provide significant opportunities to improve the financial position
of banks without raising any of the concerns which underlie Glass-
Steagall.
tal Illinois Bank was recently found to have violated lending limits in loans made to First Options of
Chicago, a non-banking subsidiary of Continental's parent holding company. See Povich, supra note
16.
112. This Note recognizes that confining non-traditional activities to separate affiliates would pre-
vent banks from using federally insured deposits to fund such activities. Since the FDIC does not
guarantee repayment of money invested in non-banks, this would ensure that banks do not gain an
unfair advantage over non-banks in competing for the business of third parties. See R. LITAN, supra
note 14, at 146. Non-banks would not be affected, however, when banks merely securitized and sold
their own assets. Banks would not pay a non-bank to securitize their assets if they had the power to
do so themselves or to do so through non-subsidized affiliates.
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